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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the indirect linkages among foreign direct investment (henceforth, FDI) 
and poverty reduction, where so far there are few studies attempted to analyze empirically this 
linkages. Yet I have a question: do we believe that FDI inflows are able to contribute to 
higher growth and employment in poor countries? I argue yes. Behavior of FDI says 
something important.  FDI inflows vary across international borders and conditioned by host 
country environment therefore FDI can contribute to higher growth and employment in poor 
countries but only under certain circumstances, “Roll out the red carpet for foreign investors 
and they will come”. Countries with better financial systems, healthy business environment 
and human development are able to attract more FDI and exploit it more efficiently. 
Empirical analysis using panel data of 62 countries, from 1996 to 2007, shows that FDI 
appears regularly to be a key source of employment and has a favorable effect on economic 
growth of low income countries if interacted with monetary and nonmonetary variables.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore both analytically and empirically the indirect linkages 
among FDI and poverty alleviation which is not yet fully understood and have been neglected 
in the literature. For instance, the FDI-financial market development-economic growth and 
FDI-human development-economic growth linkages and its impact on income generation and 
subsequent poverty reduction are not directly considered in the literature. The FDI-
employment linkages which are another channel through which FDI and poverty could be 
linked, have not received adequate attention in the literature. 
The importance of understanding those indirect linkages as highlighted above is especially 
pronounced in poverty-stricken countries like low income countries. In this context, this paper 
argues that these linkages need to be analytically understood and empirically examined. The 
objective is that the financial market development, human development and foreign 
investment integration do not remain only ends in themselves but emerge as tools to reduce 
poverty, especially in low income countries.  
[Table 1 goes about here] 
Table 1 show that flows of FDI have grown considerably in recent decades. In 1986, the level 
of FDI inflows stood at US$ 86 Billion and by 2006 it stood at US$ 1461 Billion. FDI flows 
have increased from approximately 0.6% of world GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to a 
share between 2% and 3% since the end of millennium.  
[Table 2 goes about here] 
Table 2 show that the stock of FDI have increased from a level of about 8% of world GDP at 
the beginning of the 1980s to 25% of world GDP in 2006. 
This increase of FDI has had major effects on the social welfare of the citizens of low income 
host countries. Dollar and Kraay (2001) showed that the general effects of FDI on growth are 
indeed essential, that growth tends to lift the incomes of the poor proportionately with overall 
growth. Deininger and Squire (1996) and Ravallion (1996) they found a strong positive 
relationship between growth and poverty alleviation. Roemer and Gugerty (1997) showed that 
on average the poor do benefit from economic growth. 
FDI by its nature relies on capital flow from abroad therefore, it is important to realize that the 
improvement of economic growth for the host economy might crucially depend on the degree 
of the development of local financial markets and workforce. The lack of financial markets 
and human development can constrain potential foreign investors. 
Although the empirical evidence on FDI and economic growth is ambiguous, the Interaction 
between financial markets and growth itself has been studied impressively and has reached 
positive conclusions i .e, that well-developed financial markets promote growth. See King and 
Levine (1993a,b), Beck et al. (2000a,b) and Levine et al. (2000). 
This paper attempts to examine the indirect impact of FDI on poor country economic growth 
and employment if interacted with monetary and nonmonetary variables .To do this first, I use 
a financial market and Human development variables that exist in the literature and employ 
them in growth regressions to study the impact of the interaction of these variables with FDI 
on economic growth of low income countries compared with upper middle and OECD 
countries.  
Second, I use a Granger causality tests to examine the Impact of FDI on employment. 
Against this background, Section 2 “Roll out the red carpet for foreign investors and they will 
come” presents a synthesis of various channels through which FDI-financial market 
development- trade - economic growth  could be linked and its indirect impact on poverty 
alleviation, Section 3 FDI inflows, human development and employment: A theoretical 
framework, this section focuses on FDI - employment linkages which are another channel 
through which FDI and poverty could be linked, Section 4  This section emphasizes the 
econometric analysis using  panel data of 62 countries, from 1996 to 2007, investigating 
whether  the  empirical evidence supports the view that FDI has a statistically significant 
influence on economic growth in poor countries ( low income country) in comparison with 
high and upper middle income countries if interacted with monetary and nonmonetary 
variables, Section 5 Granger causality tests on the relationship between FDI- employment 
across 62 countries from 1996 to 2007, Section 6 conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. FDI and poverty alleviation linkages  
2.1 Linkages among FDI - Financial Market – economic growth and Poverty Alleviation. 
[Figure 1 goes about here] 
In figure 1 data on FDI and financial development shows the links between financial market 
development (Private credit to deposits)
3
 and FDI inflows, i.e. countries with better developed 
financial markets are able to absorb more from FDI to promote their economic growth and 
reduce poverty. Figure 1 show that the level of financial development is crucial for these 
positive effects to be realized.  
[Figure 2 goes about here] 
Figure 2 show the indirect linkages among FDI - Financial Market – economic growth and 
Poverty reduction. Financial development promotes growth and there is extensive evidence 
that growth worldwide has been a powerful mechanism for reducing poverty. Dehejia and 
Gatti (2002) who study child labor well-known to be a correlate of poverty, they find that the 
incidence of child labor seems to be affected on a cross-country basis by the degree of 
financial depth. Patrick Honohan (2008) show that a 10 percentage point in the ratio of private 
credit to GDP should reduce poverty ratios by 2.5 to 3 percentage points. This finding 
suggests that the theories that argue that financial development can help the poor may have 
some support.  
Schumpeter (1911) argues that monetary institutions are important and money could be a 
separate driving force.  Literature on finance goes hand in hand with that line. It can be argued 
that reduce transaction costs, allocate the capital to the highest returns projects will lead to 
higher output growth and reduce poverty. Gurley and Shaw (1955); Goldsmith (1969) and 
Hicks (1969) showed that development of a financial system is important in catalyzing the 
economic growth.  McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that any increase in the level of 
financial development, which follows financial liberalization, will lead to a higher level of 
growth. Beck, et al. (2000) suggested that financial systems are important for both 
productivity and development.   
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and King and Levine (1993b) showed that financial market 
development reduces informational frictions and improves resource allocation more 
efficiently.   
A review of the literature on the links between FDI and financial market suggested that FDI 
flows cannot be stepped up unless financial institutional mechanisms exist for facilitating 
                                                          
3 One of the traditional Financial Sector Development Indicators for banking (Raw data are from the electronic version of the IMF‟s 
International Financial Statistics, October 2008.  
 
foreign investment inflow. Hermes et al (2003) showed that FDI plays an important role in 
contributing to economic growth but the level of financial development is crucial for these 
positive effects to be realized. Alfaro et al. (2004) and Choong, et al.(2005) showed that better 
developed financial systems tend to benefit more from FDI. Omran, et al (2003) showed that 
domestic financial reforms should precede policies promoting FDI.  Rebecca M., et al (2009) 
examined the volatility of capital flows (FDI, portfolio flows, and other debt flows) following 
the liberalization of financial market and they found capital flows are responding differently 
to financial liberalization surprisingly, portfolio flows appear to show little response to capital 
liberalization, while FDI flows show significant increases in volatility, particularly for the 
emerging markets. 
James Ang (2009) showed that efficient financial system facilitates FDI to create backward 
linkages, which are beneficial to the local suppliers in the form of improved production 
efficiency. This implies that financial market development plays a crucial role in the host 
country and its ability to attract FDI and absorbs the benefits associated with it and reduces 
poverty. Durham (2004) observed that the deeper financial systems absorb capital inflows 
such as FDI.  
Furthermore, financial markets affect both the financing of investment and day-to-day 
business activities. Wurgler (2000) proved that even if financial development does not lead to 
higher levels of investment, it seems to allocate the existing investment better. 
2.2 Linkages among Trade (openness), FDI and Poverty Alleviation 
[Figure 3 goes about here] 
Figure 3 depicts the links between trade openness and FDI inflows. As Figure 3 suggests, 
there is a positive relationship between the trade openness and FDI inflows. However, it is 
also apparent that there is a wide variation in both variables given their interaction with one 
another. Indeed, if openness plays an important role in influencing the effects of FDI on 
output, one can expect countries with the same levels of FDI to have very different outcomes 
in terms of growth and poverty and it is impact on poverty reduction. 
[Figure 4 goes about here] 
Figure 4 shows the positive relation between trade openness and growth. There is an 
extensive literature on the nexus between trade, growth and poverty. See Berg krueger (2003),  
What we do learn is that growth generally does benefit the poor as much as everyone else, so 
that the growth enhancing policies of good rule of law, fiscal discipline, and openness to 
international trade should be at the center of successful poverty reduction strategies David 
Dollar and Aart Kraay  (2001). 
[Figure 5 goes about here] 
Figure 5 show the indirect linkages among trade - FDI – economic growth and Poverty 
reduction .The literature deduced that the decision of a foreign firm to enter into another 
market through  FDI depends on the degree of  openness of that market, thus openness of an 
economy contributes to higher FDI and, therefore, to higher growth. Balasubramanyam et al 
(1996), Kawai (1994) found that trade openness regime is crucial for acquiring the potential 
growth impact of FDI.  
De Mello (1996) showed that the causality direction between FDI and growth depends on the 
recipient country‟s trade regime, while Nair-Reichert and Weihold (2001) showed that the 
direction of causality from FDI to growth is highly heterogeneous and the degree of 
heterogeneity is more intense for more open economies. Singh and Jun (1995) found that 
export orientation is a large attraction for FDI. Dees (1998) showed that degree of openness to 
the rest of the world seems to be relevant.  
3. FDI inflows, human development and employment: A theoretical framework  
3.1 FDI – employment – poverty reduction linkages  
Employment is ideal to measure the impact of FDI on poverty “many of the poor blame their 
income shortfall on their joblessness”, this impact can be categorized into direct and indirect 
effects see figure 2 and 5. FDI inflows are accompanied by direct effect on employment 
generation and consequently poverty-reduction also indirect effect by promoting both forward 
and backward production linkages with domestic sectors and foreign firms, for instance via 
subcontracting systems between a foreign firm and local subcontractors who supply 
components or semi-finished goods to the foreign firm, additional employment is indirectly 
created and further economic activity is stimulated. 
Aaron (1999) stated that likely FDI was directly responsible for creating 26 million jobs in 
1997 (Estimates of the indirect employment effect of FDI vary widely around a multiplier of 
1.6 i.e. 1.6 indirect jobs for every one direct job) therefore, it can be argued that the indirect 
effect of FDI on employment and poverty reduction is higher than direct effect.  
Richard E. Caves (1974) examined the effect of foreign presence on value added per worker 
in domestic manufacturing sectors in Australia and found evidence of spillover hypothesis. 
He argued that by employing an increasing share of domestic firms, foreign firms were able to 
reduce the gap between foreign and domestic value. Rappapor (2000) argues that FDI 
increases the productivity not only in the firms which receive FDI, but potentially in domestic 
firms.  
Higher FDI inflows lead to higher quality of the labor force and poverty reduction. Caves 
(1998) and Tybout (2000) shows that domestic large firms linked to FDI tend to be more 
productive, suggesting that the impact of the diffusion is likely to be more effective on large 
firms than smaller ones. Large firms usually have better trained workers and infrastructure to 
absorb transferred technologies and other intangible assets than what small firms have. Filer 
et al (1995) found that foreign-owned firms in the Czech Republic spent 4.6 times on hiring 
and training more than domestic firms. A study focusing on Malaysia also showed that 
foreign-owned firms provide more training to their workers than domestic enterprises World 
Bank (1997). 
Blomstrom and Kokko, (1997) show that impact of FDI on employment varies significantly 
across industries and countries which is consistent with that FDI reduces poverty only under 
certain circumstances. 
3.2 FDI – human development – poverty reduction linkages  
The impact of FDI on poverty alleviation depends on the nature of employment created by 
FDI and its effect on the society. Workforce employed by foreign firms will depend on the 
level of education, health and sex.  
With respect to health, the World Health Organization‟s Report of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health (CMH, 2001)
4
 asserts: „„A healthy workforce is important when 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)‟‟. Population health is a creator of human capital 
that raises worker productivity and improves economic growth. High levels of healthy human 
capital in the workforce are likely to make a country more attractive to FDI. On the other 
hand high rates of worker turnover due to morbidity and mortality can raise production costs 
and discourage FDI and increase poverty.  Even diseases might also deter FDI inflows.  In 
addition to the importance of health as a consumption good, health can also be viewed as a 
form of human capital that enhances economic performance both at the individual level and at 
the level of the macro economy Bloom, Canning, & Jamison(2004).  
A substantial body of evidence has demonstrated that population health is a robust predictor 
of growth in per capita income see Barro (1991) ; Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1997) ; Bhargava, 
Jamison, Lau, & Murray (2001) and Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla (2004). Moreover, countries 
may benefit with different degrees from health. Bhargava et al. (2001) argued that economic 
growth resulting from health improvements is more pronounced in developing countries than 
in industrial countries. 
                                                          
4 See Macroeconomics and Health : Investing in Health for Economic Development  (Page 34), Report of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health Presented to Gro Harlem Brundtland Director-General of the World Health Organization in 20 December 2001 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2001/924154550x.pdf  
Improving the population health can also reduce poverty through indirect mechanisms; for 
example, improved health can increase the return to education and worker experience. 
Healthier children have enhanced cognitive function and higher school attendance, allowing 
them to become better educated, and higher earning adults Bhargava (2001) and Bloom 
(2005). 
Marcella Alsan et al (2006) argued that a one-year improvement in life expectancy is 
associated with a 9% increase in gross FDI inflows to low- and middle-income countries, and 
this result seems fairly robust. These findings are consistent with the view that health is an 
integral component of human capital for developing countries and suggest that the payoff to 
improved population health is also likely to include an elevated rate of FDI inflows.  
With respect to the level of education, Noorbakhsh et al (2001) and  Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002)
5
 argued that education does have a positive and significant impact on FDI and its 
effect has been increasing over time.   Zhang and Markusen (1999) presented a model where 
the availability of skilled and educational level of labor in the host country affects the volume 
of FDI inflows.  
With respect to sex, there are some literature deduced that FDI appears regularly to be a key 
source of employment for women in developing countries, Jenkins and Thomas (2002) 
stressed that the implications for poverty alleviation are important.  Cotton and 
Ramachandran (2001) give the reason for this, based on their research, which has shown that 
the earnings of women are most often allocated to improving the health and nutritional well-
being of their children and any increase of women‟s employment and their wages are likely to 
improve the quality of life in households in which women work. This goes hand in hand with 
Barro-Becker (1989) and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990).  
Hypotheses and Conjecture 
Based on the theoretical discussions above, I identify the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: FDI has a favorable effect on economic growth of poor countries (low income 
countries) if interacted with monetary (financial market) and nonmonetary variables (human 
development) in comparison with high and upper middle income countries 
Hypothesis 2: FDI inflows are accompanied by direct effect on employment generation 
especially for women in Non OECD countries.   
 
 
                                                          
5 They regress FDI on the human development index (HDI), which is a composite of GDP per capita, educational literacy and enrollment, 
and life expectancy at birth. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data 
Prior research was hampered by the lack of consistent cross-country data and was thus limited 
to small samples of countries. On the basis of the availability of data, a balanced panel data 
for 62 countries
6
 over the period 1996-2007 was constructed.  The countries chosen for the 
empirical work are comprised of samples from the low, upper middle-income and high 
income categories Blonigen and Wang (2004) argued that FDI flows in high income and low 
income economies follow different patterns and should be studied separately, a suggestion I 
followed in my empirical analysis. 
The measure for FDI is net FDI inflows as a percent of GDP. FDI is defined as the net inflows 
of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, long-term capital and short-term capital as shown in the 
balance of payments. FDI inflows with a negative sign indicate that at least one of the three 
components of FDI is negative and not offset by positive amounts of the remaining 
components. These are called reverse investment or disinvestment. The data are from United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2009 FDI database. 
Education index is used to capture the human capital development. It is measured by the adult 
literacy rate (with two-thirds weighting) and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary 
gross enrollment ratio (with one-third weighting). The adult literacy rate gives an indication 
of the ability to read and write, while the GER gives an indication of the level of education 
from kindergarten to postgraduate education. The data source is (UN) Human Development 
Reports from 1996 to 2008.
7
 
Regarding the measure of financial market development, Thorsten Beck, Aslı Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Ross Levine (1999) have constructed a database on Financial Development and 
Structure which contains many variables.  One of these variables is bank credit to bank 
deposits (henceforth, BCBD).  This is used as an approximate measure of the liquidity 
constraint. BCBD shows the percentage of deposits that is tied up in loans. Thus, this variable 
provides a measure for the overall size of the financial sector without distinguishing between 
different financial institutions. Data come from World Bank Financial Structure Database.
8
 
                                                          
6 Section 5 provides further data sources, countries in the samples, and the definitions of the variables used in this paper. 
7 see United Nations Development website http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/ 
8 The URL for the database is http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/FinStructure_2008_v2.xls 
Economic growth is measured as the annual percentage growth rate per capita of real gross 
domestic product (GDP) which considers a good proxy for welfare of a country. The data are 
obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
This paper employs the aggregate worldwide governance indicators made available by the 
World Bank
9
 (political stability, government effectiveness, control of corruption and rule of 
law). The details of the construction of these measures are to be found in Kaufmann et al. 
(2005). This is one of the most comprehensive compilations of data on governance currently 
available. 
This paper uses the annual inflation rate since literature argued that it can impact the stability 
of the banking sector Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Davis and Karim (2008). 
The government‟s ability to control inflation is expected to reduce investment risks and 
consequently, to increase FDI inflow. Inflation is also a measure of economic stability; 
therefore we expect a negative coefficient.  Source: World Development Indicators. 
To capture openness to international trade, this study uses the ratio of the sum of exports plus 
imports to total output (GDP). The relation between FDI and the degree of openness of a 
country capture the liberalization of the trade regime in the host country. Data come from 
Penn World Table 
10
 and the population growth data are obtained from World Development 
Indicators, World Bank. 
4.2 Panel data unit root test, FDI and growth rate 
Following the hypothesis that FDI generates significant externalities and spillovers in 
economic growth and poverty alleviation as discussed earlier, panel data unit root tests 
provide a preliminary test of that linearity hypothesis, unit root tests are used to examine 
whether my variables of interest (growth rate per capita and FDI as a percentage of GDP) are 
stationary.  I used two different tests; Levin and Lin (LL) (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(IPS) (1997) which are the most widely used methods for panel data unit root tests in the 
literature.  
[Table 3 goes about here] 
The results presented in Table 3 shows that the test statistics are all negative and greater than 
the critical values in absolute term So, I reject the null hypothesis. Test results confirm my 
believe of considerable interest since they indicate that regardless of the applied unit root test 
for a chosen income level the growth rate and FDI/GDP are stationary and that the regression 
results are not spurious.  
                                                          
9 The URL for the worldwide governance indicators  database http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
10 PWT 6.3  http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt63/pwt63_form.php 
4.3 Panel data Estimates.  
The fixed and random effects panel methods are based on the stationary assumption. Since the 
LLC and IPS tests are performed and they indicated that the growth rate and FDI are 
stationary, the conventional fixed and random effects panel methods are adequate here. 
Before proceeding to the empirical results, Hausman-test was conducted to choose the 
appropriate model (RE or FE-model).  The test produces high statistics that lead to the 
rejection of the fixed effect model.  
 The presence of homoskedastic
11
 could be a restrictive assumption for panels, where the 
cross-sectional units may be of various sizes and as a result may exhibit different variation. 
Given that FDI inflows vary across international borders, and we are dealing with different 
size countries, one should expect the heteroskedastic existences. This study uses the Feasible 
Generalized-Least-Squares (GLS) estimators developed for panel data, accounting for 
homoskedastic with no autocorrelation and heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, 
and also cross-sectional correlation alone with common AR (1) process in error terms.  
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to examine financial markets (monetary variable) and 
human development (nonmonetary variable) channels through which FDI may be beneficial 
for economic growth in low income countries in comparison with upper middle and OECD 
countries. As a starting exercise considers the following three models assuming the Presence 
of homoskedastic: 
                                              
                            
                                                             
                            5 Controlsit+ it                                                                                (2) 
                                                                    
                              5 Controlsit+ it                                                                                       ( )  
Table 4 presents results based on regressions (1), (2) and (3) under the assumption of 
homoskedastic existence to examine the role of FDI on growth through financial markets and 
human development Channels. In this paper I interact FDI with financial market and use this 
as an independent variable in regression (2) while in regression (3), I interact FDI with 
financial market and education Index and use this as a regressor too in order to test for the 
significance of financial market and human development in enhancing the positive 
externalities associated with FDI flows. The latter variables were included in the regression 
                                                          
11 The standard error component model assumes that the regression disturbances are homoskedastic with constant variance across time and 
individuals. In contrast, the regression disturbance is called heteroskedastic if it has different variance across time and individuals. 
independently in order to ensure that the interaction term does not proxy for FDI or the level 
of development of financial markets or the level of human development. 
[Table 4 goes about here] 
The interaction between FDI, financial market development and human development are 
expected to encourage economic growth in low income countries in comparison with upper 
middle and OECD countries. As expected and as shown in Table 4, the interaction term turns 
out to be significant and positively related to growth for all models except OECD countries 
model, which supports the first Hypothesis. The interpretation is that the impact of FDI on 
growth is expected to be stronger in the recipient economy more than the country of origin of 
FDI.  So if the advanced economies in the OECD countries are the main net exporters of FDI, 
then the impact should be smaller in those countries than elsewhere. 
The main result is that the interaction terms are positive and significant at the 10 % level for 
the entire range of countries‟ groups used. Moreover, the first interaction term (FDI X 
Financial market) for low income countries (poor countries) is significant at the 1% while it is 
significant at 10% for upper middle income countries and positive but not significant for 
OECD countries (FDI exporter), also we have the same results for the second interaction 
term.  
Interestingly, the coefficient of FDI is positive and significant and displays considerable 
variation within the countries‟ group. Low income countries (Poor Countries) have the 
highest coefficients for all the models.  In contrast, OECD countries (Rich countries) have the 
lowest coefficient which supports the first Hypothesis. 
Table 4 also reports 1- The joint significance test of financial markets with the interaction 
term and 2- The joint significance test of education index with the interaction term and 3- The 
joint significance test of FDI with the interaction term. For all samples‟ groups, the tests 
confirm the importance of financial markets, education and FDI.  First, with respect to 
equation 2, the hypothesis that the coefficients of both FDI, and the interaction between FDI 
and financial markets are zero cannot be rejected in all regressions at the 5 % level for all the 
entire range of countries‟ groups used except only in the case of first column (1) which 
contain all the countries in our sample (62).  Clearly, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
in this regression also report the lowest t-statistics. Second, with respect to equation 3, the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of both FDI, and the interaction between FDI, financial  
market and education  are zero cannot be rejected in all regressions at the 5 % level for all the 
entire range of countries‟ groups used and the hypothesis that the coefficients of both 
financial market, and the interaction between FDI, financial market and education are zero, is 
rejected in all regressions at the 10% level for all the entire range of countries‟ groups and 
finally the hypotheses that  the coefficients of both education , and the interaction between 
FDI, financial market and education  are zero, is rejected in all regressions at the 10 % level 
for all the entire range of countries‟ groups. 
Moreover, Table 4 also reports that financial market indicator by itself is insignificant and 
even negative for non OECD countries and low income countries.  On the other hand, there 
are mixed results for the upper middle income and OECD countries. Not surprisingly, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms of OECD sample regressions report the lowest t-statistics 
compared with the counterparts in the other columns which supports the first Hypothesis. 
4.4 Heteroskedastic Presence in the Panel data 
 Assuming homoskedastic disturbances when heteroskedastic is present will still result in 
consistent estimates of the regression coefficients. Therefore, Modified Wald test for group 
wise heteroskedastic has been conducted to test the heteroskedastic presences in regression 
(1), (2) and (3). The null is homoskedastic (or constant variance). 
[Table 5 goes about here] 
Modified Wald test  results in Table 5 reports heteroskedastic presences in the regression so, I 
rejected the null hypotheses  and conclude heteroskedastic, and due to prevailing serial 
correlation in the standard models, I run a GLS estimation accounting for heteroskedastic with  
cross-sectional correlation, and also cross-sectional correlation  with common AR (1) process 
in error terms.  
Clearly for a sample 1 and 2, if I compared the number of all existence observations in my 
model to the number of estimated parameters under FGLS regression, I will find that 
parameters estimated at least as many quantities as I have observations.  Therefore, I would 
not put great value on the results so I ignored this sample group. 
[Table 6 goes about here] 
[Table 7 goes about here] 
Table 6 and 7 show that the FGLS estimation accounting for heteroskedastic with cross-
sectional correlation, and cross-sectional correlation with common AR (1) process in error 
terms, receptively turned out to be promising results for all investigated models.  As shown in 
Table 6and 7, both interaction terms under heteroskedastic turns out to be positive and 
significant in all columns. For the first interaction term, it is significant at the 10 % level for 
the entire range of countries‟ groups except countries with high income level (FDI Importer). 
For the second interaction term, it turns out to be positive and significant at 10% level for all 
country‟s groups. 
Moreover, Table 6 and 7 shows that the coefficients of the interaction term of FDI, financial 
market indicator and education index for low income countries (Poor countries) report the 
highest coefficients compared with the counterparts in the other columns. This finding is 
consistent with the motivation of this work which is FDI have a favorable effect on growth 
especially in low income countries if interacted with monetary and nonmonetary variables.  
Interestingly, the coefficient of FDI is positive and significant and displays considerable 
variation within the countries‟ group and low income countries (Poor Countries) have the 
highest coefficient, by increasing 1% of FDI inflow which will impact 0.345% increase in 
growth rate per capita.  In contrast, upper middle income and OECD countries (Rich 
countries) have the lowest coefficient 0.048. 
Table 6 and 7also reports the joint significance test for all samples the tests confirm the 
importance of financial markets, education and FDI. As expected, inflation, corruption and 
growth rate report negative and significant coefficients for all the regressions and in the other 
hand, political stability and government effectiveness report positive and significant 
coefficients for all the regressions. So far the earlier result supports the first Hypothesis.  
4.5 Endogeneity 
One caveat can note is that the volume of FDI and the efficiency of financial markets increase 
with higher economic growth rates. This would lead to an overstatement of the impacts of 
each of the two variables and their interaction on economic growth, since we use the values of 
these variables to estimate the coefficients in equation 1, 2 and 3. Thus, in this analysis the 
ideal instruments are variables that might affect economic growth but are less likely to be 
affected by it. Therefore, I look for variables that explain FDI and financial market 
development but are less likely to be related to economic growth. I have construct instruments 
for both. First, for financial markets, The literature provides a menu of financial market 
determinants, Levine (1998, 1999), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and  Claessens and 
Laeven (2003)  used La Porta et al (1998)  legal origin as instrumental variable for financial 
development (more popularly known as LLSV variables). They find that countries with 
different legal histories offer different types of legal protection to their investors. In this paper 
I used the rule of law variable to instrument financial market development as this instrument 
change over time and satisfy conditions of relevance and exogeneity, second, for FDI One of 
the major problems are the difficultly in identifying instruments that are correlated with FDI 
but not with the error term. Wheeler and Mody (1992) indicate that FDI is self-reinforcing, 
i.e. lagged value of FDI is a significant determinant of FDI inflow. Lagged FDI is used as an 
instrument for FDI.  
[Table 8 goes about here] 
Table 8 reports the results of the IV-2SLS regression method using the rule of law variable as 
instrument for financial market development and lag of FDI as instruments for FDI. Columns 
(1) – (4) confirms the major findings from Table 6 and 7 that FDI promotes economic growth 
better through financial markets and human development channels in low income countries 
(poor countries) compared with upper middle and OECD countries (rich countries). These 
instruments are valid if the error term is not serially correlated.  In table 8 Sargan tests for 
overidentifying restrictions providing evidence of validity of the choice of instruments. 
4.6 Robustness analysis  
To assess the robustness of these findings, the domestic investment was controlled. Table 8 
and 9 shows the results after including domestic investment as an independent variable. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of FDI is still positive and significant and displays a considerable 
variation within the countries‟ group. The obtained results lead to interesting statements: First, 
domestic investment enters significantly in all the regressions. Second, the coefficients of FDI 
and interaction term for OECD and upper middle countries still report the lowest t-statistics 
compared with the counterpart in low income countries (Poor Countries).  The findings 
demonstrated that FDI still has a favorable effect on low income countries (Poor) if interacted 
with monetary and nonmonetary variables even after controlling for domestic investment. 
[Table 9 goes about here] 
[Table 10 goes about here] 
5. FDI, employment and Poverty alleviation - Granger Causality Test using Panel Data 
Employment is ideal to measure the impact of FDI on poverty “many of the poor blame their 
income shortfall on their joblessness”.  In this section, the findings of Granger causality tests 
on the relationship between FDI and employment across 62 countries for the period 1997-
2007 were reported.  
One of the fundamental problems inherent in literature is that, to date, no specific causality 
analysis of the mutual relationship between FDI and employment has been conducted. The 
reason is that sufficiently long time series necessary for using Granger causality tests are not 
available. However, recent theoretical developments in Granger causality methods have made 
tests using relatively short time series possible through the use of panel data approach
12
, 
                                                          
12 As using micro-panels, where there are large numbers of cross-section units and small numbers of time series observations, the FE 
estimator of the coefficients of lagged endogenous variables is biased and inconsistent Nickell, (1981). On the other hand, the ML estimators 
for the dynamic fixed effects models remain biased with the introduction of exogenous variables when T is small Hurlin and Venet,( 2001). 
Moreover, Kiviet (1995) also provides an analytical expression for this bias. However, Nickell, (1981) demonstrates a fall in the size of bias 
on the coefficients of lagged endogenous variables with the presence of exogenous regressors. Furthermore, Judson and Owen (1999) 
provide Monte Carlo evidence and show that the FE estimator‟s bias decreases with T. Thus, for our case, we have decided to use the FE 
estimator since the bias is not large  and the available literature does also show evidence in favor of fixed effects models for similar cases. 
adapting the methodology proposed by (Larrain et al., 1997; Hurlin and Venet, 2001 Robert et 
al, 2005) and recently applied by Erdil and Yetkiner (2008). 
FDI inflow measures the amount of FDI entering a country during one year period, while the 
FDI stock emphasizes the monetary dimension of FDI which is the total amount of productive 
capacity owned by foreign affiliates in the host country.  It grows over time and includes all 
retained earnings of foreign-owned firms held in cash and investments.  Therefore,  I have 
decided to use FDI stock inflow/GDP instead of FDI/GDP as FDI stock associated with 
production and production is associated with employment. The paper tested for Granger 
causality between two variables: FDI, measured by FDI stock inflow/GDP and employment, 
proxied by different measure:  First, total employment to population; Second, female 
employment over 15 year and third, male employment over 15 years.  All data are expressed 
in logarithms in order to include the proliferative effect of time series.   
FDI stock inflow/GDP data come from: UNCTAD 2009 FDI database and employment data 
come from Gender Info
13
 2007 database.  
Consider a time-stationary VAR representation, adapted to a panel data context. For each 
individual   I have           : 
         
         
 
   
            
 
   
                         
         
         
 
   
            
 
   
                     
With         and                    and                   where         and        are i.i.d 
(0,  
 ), i.i.d (0,  
  ), respectively.  
First step: The hypotheses to be tested are the homogenous non-causality hypotheses, given 
by: 
For equation (4) 
     
                            
                                                       
            
For equation (5) 
     
                           
                                                       
            
                                                          
13 Gender Info 2007 is a global database of gender statistics and indicators on a wide range of policy areas, including: population, families, 
health, education, work, and political participation It is an initiative of the United Nations Statistics Division, produced in collaboration with 
the United Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 
In the general case, the test statistics can be computed by the following Wald test proposed by 
Hurlin and Venet (2001) 
      
                  
                 
 
Where SN denotes the total number of observations,      stands for the restricted sum of 
squared residuals obtained under  , whereas      is unrestricted sum of squared residual 
computed from equations 4 and 5. This procedure also follows a standard Granger causality 
assumption where the variables entered into the system need to be time-stationary. Thus, the 
two variables are subjected to Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) unit root testing. 
Table 10 reports unit root test for the level of FDI and employment, the unit root test statistics 
are significant at the 5% level, for all sub-groups and overall samples. 
[Table 11 goes about here] 
Given these results, I ought to use stationary original level variables for conducting the 
Granger causality analysis. The causality relationships between two variables are subject to 
investigation. I computed the panel data VAR (equation 4, 5) with the usual FE estimator, the 
Fhnc statistics are reported in Table 11. 
[Table 12 goes about here] 
To investigate the contemporaneous relationships between FDI and employment, I fitted the 
conventional panel data models. First, for all countries, FDI =  (Emp), FDI =  (Empfem15), 
second for Non OECD countries, FDI =   (Emp), FDI =   (Empfem15) and finally, for 
OECD countries (FDI exporter) FDI =   (Empmal15).  I selected the estimator fixed or 
random effects using two diagnostic statistics: Hausman (H) test statistics and Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM). The results are given in Table 13. 
[Table 13 goes about here] 
Collectively, all models revealed a reasonable overall fit. For the Non OECD countries, a 
positive significant coefficient of FDI is computed implying that FDI creates more jobs. FDI 
Granger causes employment in Non OECD countries (FDI Importer). Interestingly, FDI 
Granger cause female employment and this confirm the second Hypothesis regarding the 
relation between FDI and poverty reduction, since they indicate that FDI appears regularly to 
be a key source of employment for women in developing countries. With this, Jenkins and 
Thomas (2002) stress that the implications for poverty alleviation are important.  Cotton and 
Ramachandran (2001) give the reason for this, based on their research, which has shown that 
the earnings of women are most often allocated to improving the health and nutritional well-
being of their children, and any increase in women‟s employment and/or increases in their 
wages are likely to improve the quality of life in households where women work. This goes 
hand in hand with Barro-Becker (1989) and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990).  
One could argue that the reason that FDI appears significant and Granger causality for 
employment in the above mentioned analysis, this is because we are considering FDI the only 
engine for job creation which is not true because we are assuming that FDI inflows is 
accompanied by direct effect on employment opportunities creation, also indirect effect, by 
promoting both forward and backward production linkages with domestic sectors and foreign 
firms, for instance via subcontracting systems. My believes and analysis results are goes hand 
in hand with Aaron (1999) who states that likely FDI was directly responsible for  creating 26 
million jobs in 1997. Estimates of the indirect employment effect of FDI vary widely around a 
multiplier of 1.6 (i.e. 1.6 indirect jobs for every one direct job) therefore, it can be argued that 
the indirect effect of FDI on employment and poverty reduction is higher than direct effect.  
Table 13 reports other interesting results, OECD countries FDI Granger Cause male 
employment opportunity in opposite way (negative and significant). The interpretation is that 
FDI outflows from OECD countries lead to job losses in the source countries.  George and 
Papaconstantinou (1996) argued that US FDI outflows have been found to cause job losses in 
the US. 
5. Conclusion 
Recently, FDI becomes one of the few ways in which low level income countries can access 
capital for development and growth and subsequent poverty alleviation. The paper provided 
some analytical insights into the issue by presenting a brief overview of some of the important 
channels, in particular, FDI and the impact of its interaction with local financial markets and 
human development on economic growth of low income countries in comparison with upper 
middle and OECD countries. True, there is no simple mechanism for achieving low level of 
poverty and FDI is in itself no panacea, but the interaction between FDI and other variables 
could emerge as tool to benefit of that integration in terms of employment and income 
generation and poverty alleviation in poor countries. 
The lack of buildup human knowledge and development of local financial markets, in 
particular, can adversely limit an economy‟s ability to absorb the benefits associated with 
FDI. Whereas, undeveloped financial markets may mean that a country is not in a position to 
cope with direct investment inflow. In the meanwhile, policy makers need to monitor trends 
carefully and accordingly adapt financial market policy, human development programs and 
business environment in order to reduce poverty. 
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Table 1 FDI inflow 1986 - 2006 
 Value (billion dollars)  %  GDP 
1986 1996 2006  1986 1996 2006 
World 86 390 1461  0.6 1.3 3 
Developed economies 71 237 973  0,6 1 2.7 
Developing economies 16 147 434  0.6 2.3 3.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
14
 0.7 3.7 38  0.4 1.9 7.6 
COMESA 1 1 18  1 0.7 6.07 
Source: UNCTAD (2009), World Investment Report. FDI inflows comprise capital provided (either directly or through other related 
enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to a FDI enterprise, or capital received by a foreign direct investor from a FDI enterprise. FDI 
includes the three following components: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans.  Equity capital is the foreign direct 
investor's purchase of shares of an enterprise in a country other than that of its residence.  Reinvested earnings comprise the direct 
investor's share (in proportion to direct equity participation) of earnings not distributed as dividends by affiliates or earnings not remitted to 
the direct investor. Such retained profits by affiliates are reinvested. Intra-company loans or intra-company debt transactions refer to short- 
or long-term borrowing and lending of funds between direct investors (parent enterprises) and affiliate enterprises. 
 
 
Table 2 FDI Inward Stock 1986 - 2006 
     FDI Inward Stock Value (billion dollars)  %  GDP 
1986 1996 2006  1986 1996 2006 
World 1096 3246 12404  8 11 25 
Developed economies 693 2240 8645  6 10 24 
Developing economies 402 988 3364  16 16 28 
Sub-Saharan Africa  19 44 147  12 23 30 
COMESA 11 23 74  11 14 25 
Source: UNCTAD (2009), World Investment Report, FDI stock is the value of the share of their capital and reserves (including retained 
profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprises 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author elaboration (FDI/GDP source UNCTAD(2009), Privet  credit by deposit source IMF’s International Financial Statistics, October 2008 ) 
Fig 1 Countries in this plot are the 62 countries (the sample data of this paper) . 
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 excluding South Africa 
 
 
Figure 2 the indirect linkages among FDI - Financial Market – economic growth and Poverty 
reduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Relation between trade and FDI. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Author elaboration, Countries in this plot is the 62 countries (the sample data of this paper. 
 
Figure 4 Relation between trade and GDP per capita growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author elaboration, Countries in this plot is the 62 countries (the sample data of this paper) 
 
 
Figure 5 the indirect linkages among trade - FDI – economic growth and Poverty reduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Combined results of the panel unit root tests. 
  Growth per Capita  FDI/GDP 
LL IPS  LL IPS 
Paper Sample   (62) 
-7.183 
 (0.000)*** 
-4.508 
(0.000)*** 
 -5.434 
(0.000)*** 
-3.914 
(0.000)*** 
High income level :OECD  (14) 
-2.647 
 (0.004)** 
-1.686  
(0.04)* 
 -2.410  
(0.008)** 
-1.891 
(0.02)* 
Non OECD  (48) 
-8.594  
(0.000)*** 
-5.801 
(0.000)*** 
 -4.876 
(0.000)*** 
-3.553 
(0.000)*** 
 Low income level (19) 
-7.872  
(0.000)*** 
-5.218 
(0.000)*** 
 -2.952  
(0.001)** 
-2.950 
(0.002)** 
Lower Middle income. (14) 
-2.759  
(0.002)** 
-1.707  
(0.04)* 
 -1.749  
(0.04) * 
-1.496 
(0.06) † 
Upper Middle income (15) 
-5.109  
(0.000)*** 
-3.816 
(0.000)*** 
 -3.257  
(0.000)*** 
-1.797  
(0.03) * 
         † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
 
Table 4 homoskedastic, no autocorrelation FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FDI/GDP 0.163 
(3.93)*** 
0.175 
(3.09)** 
0.210 
(1.93)† 
.170 
(1.72)† 
.086 
(2.32)* 
 .156 
(3.74)*** 
.229 
(3.85)*** 
.411 
(2.61)** 
.157 
(1.62) 
.047 
(0.94) 
 .133 
(3.01)** 
.162 
(2.91)** 
.259 
(2.35)* 
.146 
(1.50) 
.048 
(0.95) 
Interaction term 
__ __ __ __ __ 
 .108 
(1.72)† 
.306 
(2.77)** 
.388 
(1.75)† 
.846 
(2.77)** 
.064 
(1.14) 
 .149 
(1.95)† 
.551 
(3.64)*** 
.697 
(2.05)* 
.973 
(2.82)** 
.064 
(1.10) 
Financial market -0.003 
(-1.09) 
-0.004 
(-1.17) 
-.012 
(-1.62) 
.003 
(0.44) 
-.008 
(-2.32)* 
 -.007 
(-1.97)* 
-.016 
(-2.90)** 
-.025 
(-2.50)* 
-.041 
(-2.28)* 
-.011 
(-2.51)* 
 -.007 
(-2.09)* 
-.019 
(-3.57)*** 
-.024 
(-2.70)** 
-.041 
(-2.32)* 
-.011 
(-2.49)* 
Education 0.015 
(1.70) † 
0.016 
(1.54) 
.037 
(2.29)* 
.190 
(3.29)** 
.108 
(1.83) † 
 .015 
(1.68) † 
.015 
(1.46) 
.034 
(2.08)* 
.135 
(2.25)* 
.112 
(1.91)† 
 .019 
(2.06)* 
.030 
(2.68)** 
.057 
(3.03)** 
.140 
(2.37)* 
.112 
(1.91)† 
Population 
Growth 
-0.828 
(-5.90)*** 
-0.901 
(-5.31)*** 
-.389 
(-0.81) 
-.403 
(-1.60) 
-.377 
(-1.92)† 
 -.846 
(-6.02)*** 
-.892 
(-5.29)*** 
-.395 
(-0.82) 
-.606 
(-2.36)* 
-.414 
(-2.09)* 
 -.846 
(-6.02)*** 
-.860 
(-5.12)*** 
-.205 
(-0.42) 
-.58 
(-2.30)* 
-.412 
(-2.08)* 
Political Stability 
No Violence 
0.007 
(3.08)*** 
0.007 
(2.43)* 
.005 
(1.14) 
.030 
(2.87)** 
.009 
(1.76)† 
 .007 
(3.15)** 
.007 
(2.43)* 
.006 
(1.20) 
.031 
(3.04)** 
.009 
(1.67)† 
 .007 
(3.15)** 
.006 
(2.32)* 
.004 
(0.89) 
.031 
(3.03)** 
.009 
(1.67) † 
Government 
Effectiveness 
0.003 
(0.78) 
0.008 
(1.36) 
.015 
(1.57) 
.012 
(0.81) 
.009 
(1.29) 
 .004 
(0.84) 
.008 
(1.38) 
.015 
(1.57) 
.014 
(1.01) 
.011 
1.44 
 .004 
(0.80) 
.007 
(1.29) 
.016 
(1.65)† 
.013 
(0.93) 
.011 
(1.44) 
Control of 
Corruption 
-0.012 
(-2.72)** 
-0.012 
(-2.20)* 
.001 
(0.17) 
-.027 
(-2.11)* 
-.012 
(-1.87) † 
 -.012 
(-2.79)** 
-.011 
(-2.01)* 
.002 
0.20 
-.028 
(-2.17)* 
-.013 
(-1.97)* 
 -.012 
(-2.85)** 
-.011 
(-2.02)* 
.002 
(0.28) 
-.026 
(-2.08)* 
-.013 
(-1.97)* 
Trade volume 0.008 
(2.58)* 
0.009 
(2.37)* 
-.004 
(-0.50) 
.011 
(1.75)† 
.001 
(0.22) 
 .009 
(2.77)** 
.009 
(2.55)* 
-.003 
(-0.43) 
.012 
(1.98)* 
.002 
(0.47) 
 .009 
(2.80)** 
.009 
(2.56)* 
-.006 
(-0.75) 
.012 
(2.02)* 
.002 
(0.47) 
Inflation -0.018 
(-0.91) 
-.017  
(-0.73) 
-.075 
(-1.91)† 
-.012 
(-0.25) 
-.004 
(-0.08) 
 -.020 
(-1.01) 
-.020 
(-0.86) 
-.082 
(-2.10)* 
-.014 
(-0.28) 
-.003 
(-0.07) 
 -.023 
(-1.12) 
-.029 
(-1.22) 
-.085 
(-2.17)* 
-.021 
(-0.43) 
-.003 
(-0.08) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy 
0.009 
(2.28)* 
0 .011 
(2.33)* 
.0003 
0.03 
.0314 
(2.19)* 
__ 
 .010 
(2.44)* 
.013 
(2.71)** 
.003 
(0.41) 
.037 
(2.66)** 
__ 
 .010 
(2.49)* 
.015 
(3.02)*** 
.005 
(0.52) 
.038 
(2.70)** 
__ 
No of Obs 744 576 228 180 168  744 576 228 180 168  744 576 228 180 168 
No of countries 62 48 19 15 14  62 48 19 15 14  62 48 19 15 14 
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
152.38 
(0.000)*** 
128.72 
(0.000)*** 
35.64 
(0.000)*** 
94.60 
(0.000)*** 
29.56 
(0.000)*** 
 155.93 
(0.000)*** 
138.11 
(0.000)*** 
39.19 
(0.000)*** 
106.31 
(0.000)*** 
31.08 
(0.000)*** 
 156.96 
(0.000)*** 
144.91 
(0.000)*** 
40.49 
(0.000)*** 
106.78 
(0.000)*** 
31 
(0.000)*** 
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      18.48 
(0.000)*** 
17.36 
(0.000)*** 
6.86 
(0.03)* 
10.75 
(0.004)** 
6.71 
(0.03)* 
 19.36 
(0.000)*** 
23.00 
(0.000)*** 
8.00 
 (0.01)* 
11.06 
(0.004)** 
6.63 
(0.03)* 
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      4.14  
(0.12) 
9.06 
(0.01)* 
6.28 
(0.04)* 
7.87 
(0.01)* 
6.70 
(0.03)* 
 5.01  
(0.08) † 
14.63 
(0.000)*** 
7.43 
 (0.02)* 
8.18 
(0.01)* 
6.62  
(0.03)* 
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            6.71  
(0.03)*  
15.64 
(0.000)*** 
9.55 
 (0.008)** 
19.29 
(0.000)*** 
4.61  
(0.09)† 
Notes: All regressions have a constant positive  term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Population growth is the growth rate for the period. the 
inflation is log (1 + inflation rate) for the period. Trade volume is log (average of exports + imports as a share of GDP) Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
 
Table 5 Modified Wald test  
 H0: sigma (i) ^2 = sigma^2 for all I, † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model (1)      
     
( Prob >   ) 
13473.34 
(0.000)*** 
5014.35 
(0.000)*** 
1084.16 
(0.000)*** 
268.51 
(0.000)*** 
242.32 
(0.000)*** 
Model (2)      
     
( Prob >   ) 
12445.91 
(0.000)*** 
5185.88 
(0.000)*** 
1229.57 
(0.000)*** 
109.45 
(0.000)*** 
252.91 
(0.000)*** 
Model (3)      
     
( Prob >   ) 
13149.56 
(0.000)*** 
4431.79 
(0.000)*** 
1066.36 
(0.000)*** 
119.13 
(0.000)*** 
252.29 
(0.000)*** 
 
 
Table 6 Heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, no autocorrelation FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
FDI/GDP 0.271 
(5.44)*** 
0.172 
(7.12)*** 
0.087 
(6.07)***   
 0.482 
(7.36)*** 
0.064 
(1.95)† 
0.065 
(4.01)***   
 0.345 
(5.87)*** 
0.042 
(1.39) 
0.048 
(2.92)** 
  
Interaction term 
_____ _____ _____   
 0.434 
(4.26)*** 
0.600 
(6.05)*** 
0.039 
(1.27)   
 1.024 
(3.02)** 
0.812 
(7.01)*** 
0.066 
(1.85)† 
  
Financial market -0.008 
(-1.22) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
-0.006 
(-2.60)**   
 -0.025 
(-3.11)** 
-0.021 
(-3.88)*** 
-0.011 
(-4.93)***   
 -0.025 
(-3.30)** 
-0.026 
(-5.32)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.80)*** 
  
Education 0.044 
(3.94)*** 
0.178 
(10.26)*** 
0.120 
(8.16)***   
 0.041 
(3.97)*** 
0.161 
(7.21)*** 
0.110 
(4.70)***   
 0.071 
(5.99)*** 
0.141 
(5.95)*** 
0.129 
(6.45)*** 
  
Population Growth -0.754 
(-2.91)** 
-0.428 
(-4.57)*** 
-0.379 
(-6.88)***   
 -0.619 
(-2.66)** 
-0.371 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.413 
(-5.01)***   
 -0.477 
(-1.77)† 
-0.487 
(-5.13)*** 
-0.397 
(-7.00)*** 
  
Political Stability No Violence 0.006 
(1.72)† 
0.029 
(10.75)*** 
0.011 
(6.78)***   
 0.006 
(2.01)* 
0.016 
(4.32)*** 
0.009 
(4.38)***   
 0.004 
(1.06) 
0.018 
(5.61)*** 
0.011 
(6.59)*** 
  
Government Effectiveness 0.011 
(1.90)† 
0.016 
(4.31)*** 
0.011 
(4.30)***   
 0.012 
(2.39)* 
0.022 
(4.54)*** 
0.011 
(4.66)***   
 0.013 
(2.26)* 
0.023 
(6.36)*** 
0.012 
(4.50)*** 
  
Control of Corruption 0.007 
(1.34) 
-0.031 
(-6.51)*** 
-0.014 
(-6.28)***   
 0.005 
(1.12) 
-0.028 
(-5.39)*** 
-0.013 
(-7.52)***   
 0.008 
(1.43) 
-0.029 
(-7.16)*** 
-0.015 
(-6.21)*** 
  
Trade volume -0.001 
(-0.10) 
0.010 
(8.56)*** 
0.002 
(0.93)   
 -0.002 
(-0.21) 
0.010 
(5.61)*** 
0.002 
(1.20)   
 -0.003 
(-0.38) 
0.009 
(3.11)*** 
0.003 
(1.63) 
  
Inflation -0.093 
(-5.93)*** 
-0.018 
(-1.34) 
-0.038 
(-1.83)†   
 -0.096 
(-8.28)*** 
-0.012 
(-0.66) 
-0.023 
(-1.26)   
 -0.104 
(-6.84)*** 
-0.014 
(-1.04) 
-0.034 
(-1.52) 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.006 
(0.83) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.008 
(1.31) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.010 
(1.47) 
_____ _____   
No of Obs 228 180 168    228 180 168    228 180 168   
No of countries 19 15 14    19 15 14    19 15 14   
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
161.91 
(0.000)*** 
1724.27 
(0.000)*** 
620.05 
(0.000)*** 
   270.04 
(0.000)*** 
788.77  
(0.000)*** 
445.56 
(0.000)*** 
   146.66  
(0.000)*** 
841.55 
 (0.000)*** 
606.45 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      59.90 
(0.000)*** 
43.62  
(0.000)*** 
29.88 
(0.000)*** 
   34.47 
 (0.000)*** 
55.42 
 (0.000)*** 
25.35 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      18.21 
(0.000)*** 
39.65  
(0.000)*** 
24.28 
(0.000)*** 
   12.99 
 (0.001)** 
51.32 
 (0.000)*** 
14.96 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            36.01 
 (0.000)*** 
111.67 
 (0.000)*** 
44.65 
 (0.001)** 
  
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Education variable refer to Education index (based on the adult literacy rate and the combined 
GER for primary, secondary and tertiary education)The inflation is log (1 + inflation rate). Trade volume is log ( exports + imports as a share of GDP). Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
          Table 7 heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, with common AR(1)  FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
FDI/GDP 0.231 
(4.17)*** 
0.063 
(2.05)* 
0.078 
(4.29)***   
 0.416 
(4.85)*** 
0.020 
(0.51) 
0.063 
(3.05)**   
 0.300 
(4.49)*** 
-0.023 
(-0.68) 
0.065 
(3.12)** 
  
Interaction term 
_____ _____ _____   
 0.373 
(2.70)** 
0.632 
(5.09)*** 
0.031 
(0.70)   
 0.705 
(1.75)† 
0.632 
(4.97)*** 
0.027 
(0.58) 
  
Financial market -0.009 
(-1.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.56) 
-0.002 
(-0.63)   
 -0.024 
(-2.42)* 
-0.032 
(-4.42)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.14)   
 -0.021 
(-2.09)* 
-0.026 
(-4.67)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.07) 
  
Education 0.044 
(2.46)* 
0.173 
(5.80)*** 
0.087 
(3.97)***   
 0.040 
(2.34)* 
0.173 
(5.96)*** 
0.090 
(3.45)**   
 0.062 
(3.26)** 
0.188 
(7.22)*** 
0.090 
(3.44)** 
  
Population Growth -1.525 
(-4.04)*** 
-0.489 
(-5.65)*** 
-0.377 
(-4.61)***   
 -1.350 
(-3.88)*** 
-0.352 
(-2.83)** 
-0.389 
(-4.79)***   
 -1.329 
(-3.48)** 
-0.364 
(-3.17)** 
-0.388 
(-4.78)*** 
  
Political Stability No Violence 0.007 
(1.54) 
0.026 
(5.70)*** 
0.010 
(4.12)***   
 0.008 
(1.79)† 
0.028 
(6.15)*** 
0.010 
(4.06)***   
 0.005 
(1.05) 
0.015 
(3.78)*** 
0.010 
(4.07)** 
  
Government Effectiveness 0.011 
(1.17) 
0.012 
(2.63)** 
0.013 
(3.70)***   
 0.012 
(1.40) 
0.011 
(1.80) † 
0.013 
(3.77)***   
 0.014 
(1.46) 
0.013 
(2.63)** 
0.013 
(3.76)*** 
  
Control of Corruption 0.002 
(0.24) 
-0.022 
(-3.77)*** 
-0.015 
(-4.47)***   
 0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.024 
(-4.21)*** 
-0.015 
(-4.46)***   
 0.001 
(0.18) 
-0.017 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.015 
(-4.45)*** 
  
Trade volume 0.001 
(0.06) 
0.010 
(4.63)*** 
0.005 
(2.19)*   
 -0.001 
(-0.08) 
0.009 
(2.86)** 
0.005 
(2.34)*   
 -0.002 
(-0.17) 
0.012 
(6.15)*** 
0.005 
(2.30)* 
  
Inflation -0.067 
(-3.73)*** 
-0.073 
(-3.89)*** 
-0.072 
(-2.91)**   
 -0.071 
(-4.59)*** 
-0.075 
(-3.53)*** 
-0.071 
(-2.76)**   
 -0.074 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.100 
(-5.29)*** 
-0.071 
(-2.79)** 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.016 
(1.66)† 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.017 
(1.75)† 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.018 
(1.88) † 
_____ _____   
No of Obs 228 180 168    228 180 168    228 180 168   
No of countries 19 15 14    19 15 14    19 15 14   
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
103.88 
(0.000)*** 
440.40 
(0.000)*** 
211.69 
(0.000)*** 
   137.35 
(0.000)*** 
312.78 
(0.000)*** 
219.24 
(0.000)*** 
   100.66 
 (0.000)*** 
340.02 
 (0.000)*** 
218.05 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      28.21 
(0.000)*** 
27.64 
(0.000)*** 
15.50 
(0.000)*** 
   20.83 
 (0.000)*** 
25.34  
(0.000)*** 
15.68  
(0.000)*** 
  
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      8.06 
(0.01)* 
26.23 
(0.000)*** 
1.46 
(0.482) 
   4.64  
(0.09)† 
27.06  
(0.000)*** 
1.24  
(0.538) 
  
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            10.80 
 (0.004)** 
92.81  
(0.000)*** 
13.26 
(0.001)** 
  
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Education variable refer to Education index (based on the adult literacy rate and the combined 
GER for primary, secondary and tertiary education)The inflation is log (1 + inflation rate). Trade volume is log ( exports + imports as a share of GDP). Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
       
 
 
Table 8 FDI and growth: the role of financial markets and human development - endogeneity 
(IV) - Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Financial market instrumented  
by the rule of law and FDI instrumented  
by lagged FDI 
Interaction term = FD I   FM 
 Financial market instrumented  
by the rule of law and FDI instrumented  
by lagged FDI 
Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
 (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)   
FDI/GDP 1.23 
(2.82)** 
0.265 
(1.36) 
0.045 
(0.39)   
 0.743 
(1.69)† 
0.251 
(1.33) 
0.047 
(0.40)   
Interaction term 1.52 
(2.10)* 
0.359 
(0.38) 
0.021 
(0.18) 
  
 2.04 
(2.54)* 
0.017 
(0.02) 
0.023 
(0.20)   
Financial market -0.040 
(-1.57) 
-0.017 
(-0.43) 
-0.004 
(-0.44)   
 -0.073 
(2.04)* 
-0.032 
(-0.88) 
-0.004 
(-0.45)   
Education 0 .003 
(0.18) 
0.237 
(2.40)** 
0.073 
(1.07)   
 0.067 
(1.81)† 
0.210 
(2.30)* 
0.072 
(1.07)   
Population Growth -0.246 
(-0.46) 
-0.054 
(-0.13) 
-0.339 
(-1.52)   
 -0.652 
(0.97) 
-0.163 
(-0.42) 
-0.338 
(-1.52)   
Political Stability No Violence 0.006 
(1.05) 
0.024 
(2.24)** 
0.009 
(1.67)†   
 0.003 
(0.41) 
0.023 
(2.23)* 
0.009 
(1.67)†   
Government Effectiveness 0.018 
(1.67)† 
0.022 
(1.27) 
0 .009 
(1.11)   
 0 .016 
(1.00) 
0.023 
(1.39) 
0.009 
(1.10)   
Control of Corruption -0.004 
(-0.41) 
-0.024 
(-1.57) 
-0.013 
(-1.89)†   
 -0.005 
(-0.38) 
-0.024 
(-1.67)† 
-0.013 
(-1.89)†   
Trade volume 0.009 
(0.86) 
0.012 
(1.58) 
0.004 
(0.69)   
 0.019 
(1.18) 
0.013 
(1.66)† 
0.004 
(0.68)   
Inflation -0.068 
(-1.41) 
0.026 
(0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.01)   
 -0.029 
(-0.59) 
0.023 
(0.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.02)   
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.008 
(0.67) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.012 
(0.58) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
overidentification test (OIR) 0.11 0.51 0.14    0.13 0.64 0.14   
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 Heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, no autocorrelation FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
FDI/GDP 0.149 
(2.72)** 
0.111 
(3.84)*** 
0.052 
(3.69)***   
 0.407 
(4.97)*** 
0.040 
(1.72)† 
0.016 
(1.04)   
 0.233 
(3.69)*** 
0.040 
(1.71)† 
0.017 
(1.10) 
  
Investment/GDP 0.128 
(4.69)*** 
0.339 
(19.31)*** 
0.117 
(7.25)***   
 0.115 
(4.34)*** 
0.278 
(15.82)*** 
0.125 
(6.27)***   
 0.109 
(4.23)*** 
0.276 
(15.21)*** 
0.124 
(6.29)*** 
  
Interaction term 
_____ _____ _____   
 0.470 
(3.76)*** 
0.273 
(2.86)** 
0.066 
(2.45)*   
 0.929 
(2.95)** 
0.299 
(2.81)** 
0.066 
(2.36)* 
  
Financial market -0.016 
(-2.46)* 
-0.023 
(-7.53)*** 
-0.009 
(-4.51)***   
 -0.032 
(-4.16)*** 
-0.025 
(-5.43)*** 
-0.013 
(-5.13)***   
 -0.030 
(-4.18)*** 
-0.025 
(-5.42)*** 
-0.013 
(-5.10)*** 
  
Education 0.032 
(2.13)* 
0.118 
(5.81)*** 
0.071 
(4.68)***   
 0.030 
(2.12)* 
0.094 
(5.31)*** 
0.080 
(4.44)***   
 0.054 
(3.71)*** 
0.095 
(5.31)*** 
0.080 
(4.44)*** 
  
Population Growth -0.717 
(-2.19)* 
-0.533 
(-7.19)*** 
-0.626 
(-10.52)***   
 -0.644 
(-2.08)* 
-0.597 
(-7.45)*** 
-0.663 
(-10.26)***   
 -0.415 
(-1.29) 
-0.595 
(-7.34)*** 
-0.660 
(-10.28)*** 
  
Political Stability No Violence 0.005 
(2.06)* 
0.022 
(6.52)*** 
0.005 
(2.31)*   
 0.006 
(2.09)* 
0.009 
(3.66)*** 
0.004 
(2.03)*   
 0.004 
(1.32) 
0.009 
(3.53)*** 
0.004 
(2.03)* 
  
Government Effectiveness 0.008 
(1.42) 
0.002 
(0.55)*** 
0.010 
(5.08)***   
 0.008 
(1.59) 
0.017 
(4.85)*** 
0.011 
(5.13)***   
 0.012 
(2.13)* 
0.017 
(4.78)*** 
0.011 
(5.14)*** 
  
Control of Corruption 0.005 
(0.94) 
-0.016 
(-4.97)*** 
-0.007 
(-3.69)***   
 0.005 
(0.86) 
-0.022 
(-6.05)*** 
-0.008 
(-3.60)***   
 0.004 
(0.77) 
-0.022 
(-5.91)*** 
-0.008 
(-3.63)*** 
  
Trade volume -0.003 
(-0.48) 
0.003 
(1.00) 
0.004 
(1.71)†   
 -0.003 
(-0.45) 
0.005 
(2.55)* 
0.005 
(1.99)*   
 -0.007 
(-1.05) 
0.005 
(2.61)** 
0.005 
(1.98)* 
  
Inflation -0.109 
(-5.52)*** 
-0.016 
(-0.93) 
-0.082 
(-4.48)***   
 -0.111 
(-5.59)*** 
0.011 
(0.73) 
-0.085 
(-4.00)***   
 -0.112 
(-5.80)*** 
0.011 
(0.68) 
-0.086 
(-4.02)*** 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.004 
(0.58) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.008 
(1.25) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.005 
(0.80) 
_____ _____   
No of Obs 216 168 168    216 168 168    216 168 168   
No of countries 18 14 14    18 14 14    18 14 14   
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
234.06 
 (0.000)*** 
1763.28  
(0.000)*** 
556.95 
(0.000)*** 
   306.87  
(0.000)*** 
2597.78  
(0.000)*** 
478.12  
(0.000)*** 
   286.01  
(0.000)*** 
2505.80 
 (0.000)*** 
478.25 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      24.72  
(0.000)*** 
15.30  
(0.000)*** 
9.61  
(0.008)** 
   15.23 
 (0.000)*** 
14.91 
 (0.000)*** 
9.44 
 (0.00)** 
  
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      19.72  
(0.000)*** 
39.98  
(0.000)*** 
26.36  
(0.000)*** 
   18.23 
 (0.001)** 
40.38 
 (0.000)*** 
26.06 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            18.08 
 (0.000)*** 
36.64 
 (0.000)*** 
20.26 
 (0.000)*** 
  
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Education variable refer to Education index (based on the adult literacy rate and the combined 
GER for primary, secondary and tertiary education)The inflation is log (1 + inflation rate). Trade volume is log ( exports + imports as a share of GDP). Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption),   † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
 
           Table 10 heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, with common AR(1)  FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
FDI/GDP 0.135 
(2.44)* 
0.055 
(1.81)† 
0.049 
(3.40)**   
 0.310 
(3.25)** 
0.004 
(0.15) 
0.058 
(4.37)***   
 0.220 
(3.20)** 
-0.022 
(-0.81) 
0.060 
(4.52)*** 
  
Investment /GDP 0.152 
(4.91)*** 
0.363 
(19.32)*** 
0.138 
(7.96)***   
 0.144 
(4.57)*** 
0.327 
(17.12)*** 
0.131 
(6.88)***   
 0.138 
(4.57)*** 
0.292 
(13.16)*** 
0.131 
(6.92)*** 
  
Interaction term 
_____ _____ _____   
 0.318 
(2.25)* 
0.666 
(5.25)*** 
0.030 
(0.93)   
 0.743 
(2.06)* 
0.544 
(4.40)*** 
0.025 
(0.74) 
  
Financial market -0.014 
(-1.92)† 
-0.023 
(-6.10)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.28)*   
 -0.024 
(-2.78)** 
-0.054 
(-8.30)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.61)**   
 -0.026 
(-2.90)** 
-0.039 
(-7.13)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.51)* 
  
Education 0.037 
(1.87)† 
0.111 
(4.53)*** 
0.046 
(3.01)**   
 0.032 
(1.68)† 
0.088 
(4.04)*** 
0.049 
(3.08)**   
 0.052 
(2.57)* 
0.099 
(3.98)*** 
0.049 
(3.07)** 
  
Population Growth -1.019 
(-2.81)** 
-0.659 
(-8.55)*** 
-0.625 
(-7.92)***   
 -1.004 
(-2.69)** 
-0.658 
(-9.45)*** 
-0.662 
(-9.15)***   
 -0.842 
(-2.31)* 
-0.789 
(-10.00)*** 
-0.659 
(-9.11)*** 
  
Political Stability No Violence 0.005 
(1.51) 
0.019 
(5.38)*** 
0.005 
(3.11)**   
 0.006 
(1.55) 
0.023 
(6.75)*** 
0.005 
(2.78)**   
 0.003 
(0.94) 
0.005 
(1.75)† 
0.005 
(2.87)** 
  
Government Effectiveness 0.016 
(2.08)* 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
0.013 
(4.52)***   
 0.014 
(1.93)† 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.013 
(4.53)***   
 0.020 
(2.55)* 
0.010 
(2.71)** 
0.013 
(4.52)*** 
  
Control of Corruption -0.006 
(-0.91) 
-0.012 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.70)**   
 -0.006 
(-0.79) 
-0.014 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.54)***   
 -0.007 
(-1.07) 
-0.013 
(-2.96)** 
-0.009 
(-3.57)*** 
  
Trade volume 0.002 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.003 
(1.47)   
 0.001 
(0.11) 
0.004 
(1.27) 
0.003 
(1.77)†   
 -0.004 
(-0.54) 
0.005 
(2.23)* 
0.003 
(1.72)† 
  
Inflation -0.082 
(-4.18)*** 
-0.074 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.104 
(-5.78)***   
 -0.085 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.065 
(-3.75)*** 
-0.084 
(-5.60)***   
 -0.085 
(-4.39)*** 
-0.076 
(-4.25)*** 
-0.084 
(-5.59)*** 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.013 
(1.38) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.015 
(1.66)† 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.012 
(1.29) 
_____ _____   
No of Obs 216 168 168    216 168 168    216 168 168   
No of countries 18 14 14    18 14 14    18 14 14   
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
125.57  
(0.000)*** 
1015.92  
(0.000)*** 
401.69  
(0.000)*** 
   126.62  
(0.000)*** 
1301.51  
(0.000)*** 
378.30  
(0.000)*** 
   127.09 
 (0.000)*** 
927.99 
 (0.000)*** 
382.87 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      10.90  
(0.004)** 
31.86  
(0.000)*** 
48.65  
(0.000)*** 
   10.26 
 (0.005)** 
19.55  
(0.000)*** 
49.66  
(0.000)*** 
  
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      8.35  
(0.01)* 
83.16  
(0.000)*** 
7.02 
(0.02)* 
   8.51  
(0.01)* 
57.40  
(0.000)*** 
6.73  
(0.03)* 
  
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            8.49 
 (0.01)* 
38.91  
(0.000)*** 
9.58  
(0.008)** 
  
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Education variable refer to Education index (based on the adult literacy rate and the combined 
GER for primary, secondary and tertiary education)The inflation is log (1 + inflation rate). Trade volume is log ( exports + imports as a share of GDP). Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Table11 Combined results of the panel unit root tests for FDI Stock and Employment in there 
levels using Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) 
Country / Variable 
FDI Stock 
/GDP 
Employment to population 
Total Female(15+year)  Male(15+year)  
All country -15.99 *** -9.60 *** -12.37***  -8.86***  
OECDa -2.65** -2.12* -2.26*  -3.05**  
Non OECDb  -21.23*** -12.97*** -10.58***  -8.25***  
a.FDI exporter b.FDI importer 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
 
 
Table12 Granger causality analysis of FDI and employment 
Category 
FDI> 
EMP 
EMP> 
FDI 
FDI> 
FEM15 
FEM15> 
FDI 
FDI> 
MAL15 
MAL15> 
FDI 
 
All country 12.67*** 0.48 4.59* 0.06 0.59 0.24  
OECDa 0.25 0.64 0.17 1.06 7.09** 0.05  
Non OECDb  13.49*** 2.04 4.64* 0.25 0.05 0.33  
 a.FDI exporter, b.FDI importer 
 † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Table 13 Contemporaneous relationships between FDI and employment 
Category  Diagnostic tests Constant Coefficient R
2 
All Countries 
 
FDI >  
Employment 
 
 
 
 
H: 
 
 
43.98*** 
 
 
0.025 
 
 
0.004 
 
 
W: 
 
 
0.77 
LM: 28.08*** (6.41)*** (3.56)*** B : 0.99 
    O: 0.99 
FDI >  
Emp Fem 15+ 
 
H: 80.17*** 0. 031 0.003 W: 0.77 
LM: 62.42*** (9.56)*** (2.14)* B : 0.99 
    O : 0.99 
Non OECD Countries 
 
FDI >  
Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H: 32.52*** 0.023 0.005 W: 0.76 
LM: 14.72*** (4.79)*** (3.67)*** B : 0.99 
    O : 0.99 
 
FDI >  
Emp Fem 15+ 
 
      
H: 62.78*** 0.032 0.004 W: 0.74 
LM: 39.54*** (8.12)*** (2.15)* B : 0.99 
    O : 0.99 
OECD Countries 
 
FDI >  
Emp Mal 15 
      
H: 31.33*** 0.052 -0.006 W: 0.75 
LM: 14.17*** (5.98)*** (-2.66)** B : 0.99 
    O : 0.98 
H = Hausman test : LM = Lagrange Multiplier : W = within : B= Between : O = Overall  
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
List Countries in the samples: Austria, Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republic Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungry, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Benin,  Burkina Faso, 
Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kyrgyz Republic, Cambodia, Gambia, 
Mozambique,  Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo,  Tanzania, Zambia, 
Haiti, Vietnam, Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia,  Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Malaysia, Panama ,Poland,  Uruguay and South Africa. 
Sample 1: 14 Countries (OECD) High Income level 
Austria, Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republic Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Hungry, Iceland, Italy and New Zealand  
Sample 1: 19 Countries (Low income level ) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kyrgyz Republic, Cambodia, 
Gambia, Mozambique,  Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo,  Tanzania, 
Zambia, Haiti and Vietnam. 
Sample 1:15 Countries (Upper Middle income) 
Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Malaysia, Panama, Poland,  Uruguay and South Africa. 
 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation matrix 
 Mean S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Sample 1: 14 Countries (OECD) High Income level N = 168 
1.Growth 0.03 0.02          
2.FDI/GDP 0.04 0.04 0.19*         
3. BCBD 1.33 0.60 -0.17* 0.10        
4. Education 0.95 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.47*       
5. Population Growth 0.01 0.01 -0.18* 0.14 0.21* 0.14      
6. Political Stability No Violence 1.01 0.37 0.08 0.21* 0.31* 0.38* 0.15*     
7. Government Effectiveness 1.62 0.55 -0.05 0.08 0.45* 0.60* 0.31* 0.72*    
8. Control of Corruption 1.61 0.74 -0.08 0.09 0.49* 0.68* 0.30* 0.74* 0.95*   
9. Trade volume 0.74 0.27 0.24* 0.39* -0.18* -0.12 -0.27* 0.16* -0.14 -0.18*  
10. Inflation 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.20* -0.18* -0.36* -0.10 -0.26* -0.44* -0.40* 0.24* 
Sample 1: 19 Countries (Low income level ) N = 228 
1.Growth 0.02 0.04          
2.FDI/GDP 0.03 0.03 0.21*         
3. BCBD 0.77 0.38 -0.01 -0.11        
4. Education 0.41 0.25 0.20* 0.15* 0.32*       
5. Population Growth 0.03 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 -0.23* -0.66*      
6. Political Stability No Violence -0.57 0.73 0.20* 0.23* 0.04 -0.07 0.24*     
7. Government Effectiveness -0.78 0.40 0.24* 0.19* 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.60*    
8. Control of Corruption -0.79 0.38 0.12 0.13* 0.17* -0.17* 0.25* 0.56* 0.62*   
9. Trade volume 0.70 0.31 0.16* 0.43* 0.11 0.39* -0.32* 0.19* 0.26* 0.05  
10. Inflation 0.08 0.09 -0.04 0.11 -0.27* 0.23* -0.21* -0.12 -0.02 -0.19* 0.02 
 
 
Sample 1:15 Countries (Upper Middle income)  N = 180 
1.Growth 0.04 0.04          
2.FDI/GDP 0.05 0.03 0.21*         
3. BCBD 1.04 0.36 0.15 0.05        
4. Education 0.87 0.07 0.42* 0.02 0.06       
5. Population Growth 0.01 0.01 -0.34* -0.05 0.13 -0.64*      
6. Political Stability No Violence 0.26 0.43 0.26* 0.04 0.33* 0.30* -0.03     
7. Government Effectiveness 0.31 0.48 0.01 -0.19* 0.29* 0.10 0.07 0.40*    
8. Control of Corruption 0.13 0.56 -0.10 -0.24* 0.29* 0.07 0.13 0.49* 0.88*   
9. Trade volume 0.89 0.45 0.25* 0.36* 0.23* -0.16* 0.09 0.28* 0.12 -0.08  
10. Inflation 0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.15* -0.16* -0.18* -0.33* -0.16* -0.14 
Correlations reported are for the main effects, and not for the interaction terms.      
*p< 0.05. 
